Francis Fukuyama -- The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French Revolution
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This book can be viewed as an attempt to help the reader understand
major changes and developments in society and political systems, for
example: (1) the formation of tribal and family based social
organization; (2) the transformation from society based on the
status of individual toward a society in which individuals relate to
each other based on contracts and agreements; (3) a movement away
from a patrilineal society and toward one in which women are able,
for example, to own property and in which the tribal and patriarchal
structure has been destroyed and in which kinship is no longer the
basis for relations and action; and (4) importantly for those of us
who believe in democratic forms of government, the transition toward
forms of government based on the rule of law and accountability.

From status to contract -- An important development is the shift
away from society in which social status is ascribed to individuals
and where that status controls what the individual does and can do
and how that individual relates to others (e.g. her/his occupation,
marriage partner, religion, etc.) and toward a society based on
contracts, where individuals can contract with each other to form
social relationships.  According to Fukuyama, relations based on
contracts (money, property, and other obligations) have a history
that goes back (in England, at least) to the 11th or 12th centuries.
These ways of forming social relations and roles and the ability of
women to own property, form contracts, and to sue and be sued were
important in the break up of and transition from kinship societies.

How the Catholic church changed social relations and why -- The
Catholic church took a strong stand against marriages between close
kin, marriages to the widows of dead relatives, the adoption of
children, and divorce.  These changes had the effect of making the
church rich in land holdings (e.g. widows who ended up with an
estate were likely to donate property to the church) and in
increasing the holding of property by women (widows specifically).
That, in turn, destroyed tribal organization throughout Europe,
according to Fukuyama.

Fukuyama provides details about how the Catholic Church evolved to
become more and more state-like, for example: (1) Beginning with the
rediscovered Justinian Code and with fragments of Roman law, legal
scholars produced a unified, consistent body of law.  (2)
Development of a bureaucracy and the concept of office, in
particular, the distinction between the office and the office holder
produced an early model for a state-like organization.  In this
bureaucracy, office holders became salaried employees who could be
hired and fired based on the quality of their work.

Law, in Europe became the motive and the process by which state
institutions grew and took shape.  The ability to offer and enforce
consistent justice and laws across an area became an important
enabler of the state.  The Magna Carta was not a demand by warlords
to be exempted from the law nor a demand for special treatment; it
was a demand for consistent, general rules and law and consistent
administration of justice.

The existence of a separate religious authority (especially one
governed by laws) pressured rulers (e.g. kings) to accept the idea
that they were not the ultimate source of law nor that they were
above the law.  Chinese emperors, for example, did *not* learn this.
The great political struggles of early modern Europe concerned
monarchs who attempted to put themselves above the law, who
attempted to make or claimed they could make their own laws, and who
claimed that they were not bound by prior law, custom, or religion.
The development of a strong legal profession with an interest in
interpreting and enforcing and administering the law was also
important.

The three components of political development that constitute modern
politics: (1) the transition out of tribal or kinship-based social
organization; (2) the emergence of the rule of law; and (3)
accountable government.  These led to (1) individual freedom of
choice with regard to social and property relationships and (2)
political rule limited by transparent and predictable law.  And all
of these were created by a pre-modern institution, specifically the
medieval church.

Later chapters of the book examine details concerning how modern
states evolved, formed more centralized governments, and made that
centralized government accountable, to varying degrees in several
recent instances.  This story and its variations turns on a struggle
between a central power (a monarchy, an elected government, the
aristocracy, or the oligarchy) and the third estate (everyone
else).

Ideas are causes -- The conceptual and mental models that we have
(or that our society has) determine the kind of political and social
order that we get.  Expectations are important; they determine the
nature of our political, social, legal, and economic systems.  If
our society acquires an understanding of the rule of law and comes
to expect everyone, including rulers and leaders, to follow the rule
of law, then we are likely (or at least, more likely) to obtain a
system that is consistent with it.

Fukuyama's account of the formation and behavior of political
organization in China is especially interesting.  He has said, in
this book and elsewhere that a highly centralized and autocratic
form of government can be especially effective when it is working
well, but that he'd rather not experience the bad consequences when
it is working badly.  It's known in China as "the bad emperor
problem", and Fukuyama gives some examples of what goes wrong when
the emperor is not accountable and when the emperor either ignores
or actively suppresses the bureaucracy in his government. Fukuyama's
attitude shows through here, in particular in his description of the
horrors inflected by "The evil Empress Wu" and in his claim that the
(central) Chinese government has never been under the rule of law in
the sense that it has always considered itself above and in control
of the law.  Having said that, Fukuyama goes on to describe some of
the limitations and restrictions that, across time, have limited the
power of the central Chinese government and softened its effect on
the population.  Among these are (1) lack of incentive to deal with
such a huge and complex system, population, and nation (land and
ownership records were not up to date and, given the lack of a
common money, taxes must be collected in kind, so what do you do
with all that grain and radishes?); (2) in part because of push back
from the population, Chinese emperors often tended to collect just
enough taxes to satisfy their needs rather than attempting to
maximize the amounts collected; and (3) given the enormous size of
the Chinese system, power and tasks must be delegated down multiple
levels and across large distances which dilutes and transfers power
away from the up most levels of central power.  In the case of the
Ming dynasty (1368 to 1644) these inabilities to collect taxes
eventually led to a failure to pay soldiers and to maintain security
and to an eventual collapse.

Fukuyama claims that Chinese governments in the past and today fail
to satisfy two important conditions of advanced government,
specifically the rule of law and accountability.  Chinese government
has always been and currently is above the law.  And, as for
accountability, government at all levels is accountable only to the
levels above it, leaving the top most level (the emperor earlier and
the top level of the Chinese Communist Party currently) accountable
to no one.  That leaves people with no recourse, when things go
wrong or when injustices are committed by local government
officials, other than appeal to the top most level or rioting.

Fukuyama's vision of history has direction and an end point.  It
also has an important side effect.  The end point has three aspects:
(1) a strong state, (2) the rule of law, and (3) accountability.
The important side effect is a successful economy (and an improved
standard of living).  There is an important point to be derived from
this: once other (less successful) nations see that a successful
economy results from those first three (strong state, rule of law,
accountability), they will all want the same.  

One impressive aspect of Fukuyama's vision is how generic it is.
It's obvious that he is a believer in the value of democratic forms
of government.  But, he is willing to be satisfied with any of a
variety of democratic organizations (parliamentary, representative
legislature, etc.) as long as the state is reasonably strong; the
government is reasonably consistent in following and enforcing a set
of laws and does not put itself above that law; and those in the
government are accountable to citizens in some way.  I suspect that
for Fukuyama, it is not even that important whether citizens are
able to chose their leaders and government officials, just so long
as they can effectively show their displeasure and can "throw the
bums out" when they are displeased.

But, there are several things wrong, or at least weak, about this
picture.  For one, you can get a successful political system with a
strong state, rule of law, and accountability, and still not have a
safe and reliable economic system.  We've seen that in the crash of
2008 and are seeing it now in the debt crisis that is afflicting the
European Union (in 2011).  For more on this see "Culture and
prosperity" by John Kay.  And, second, this view does not help us
deal with the problems that beset a democratic system, such as
degeneration into patrimony, capture of legislative and regulatory
bodies by powerful and wealthy interests, etc.  A third problem is
that accountable (democratic) systems seem very weak in their
ability to do long range planning and decision making.  Fukuyama
does not seem to have much in the way of an explanation of this nor
suggestions about how it might be alleviated.  Perhaps that is an
inevitable feature of an explanation that is as broad and general as
Fukuyama's.

There is one aspect or gap in Fukuyama's explanation that I'd like
to see him spend more time on.  He mentions several times how
precarious the development of a well functioning political system
is, specifically one with a strong state, rule of law, and
accountability.  Theorists in the areas of contingency, chaos, path
dependence, and biological evolution all have something to say about
this.  I'd like to see those theories applied to Fukuyama's.  For
example, if we had the ability to "rewind and play the tape" over on
the development of a specific democratic state, would small
differences in initial (earlier) conditions make the development of
a functioning state unlikely?  Or, is the kind of successful state
that Fukuyama describes an attractor, in terms used in chaos theory,
so that most states arrive there eventually, though perhaps by
different and crooked paths?

So, I won't say that Fukuyama has the answers to all our questions,
but I do think his way of structuring our thinking about political
and societal organizations is interesting and that it certainly
provides a platform for asking question about and thinking about how
political and social systems form and organize themselves.  If you
are interested in broad systems theory, it's definitely worth
reading.

11/06/2011

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